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FACTORS AFFECTING ETHICAL SOURCES OF EXTERNAL 
DEBT FINANCING FOR INDIAN AGRIBUSINESS FIRMS 
 
Amarjit Gill*, Harvinder S. Mand**, John D. Obradovich***, Neil Mathur**** 
 
Abstract 
 
Majority of the Indian farmers are financially constrained and pay very high interest rate to private 
moneylenders which has a negative impact on the survivability and growth of agribusiness firms. 
Because of less strict debt financing requirements farmers become prey to predatory lenders from 
private lending institutions that are not controlled by the central bank and may not behave in an 
ethical way. The study investigates factors affecting ethical sources of external debt financing by 
taking a sample of Indian agribusiness firms. Owners of agribusiness firms were interviewed through 
personal visits and telephone calls regarding the factors affecting ethical sources of external debt 
financing. The findings show that several factors affect ethical sources of external debt financing for 
agribusiness firms in India. This study contributes to the literature on the factors that affect ethical 
sources of external debt financing. This study also provides recommendations to improve access to 
ethical sources of external debt financing. The findings may be useful for agribusiness owners 
(farmers), financial managers, investors, agribusiness management consultants, entrepreneurs, and 
other stakeholders. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Majority of the Indian farmers are financially 
constrained and pay a very high interest rate to private 
moneylenders (Ghosal and Ray, 2015). 
Agribusinesses act as the backbone of the Indian 
economy by creating more than 1.1 million jobs per 
year (Acharya, 2007) and contributing approximately 
18.5% to Gross Domestic Products (GDP).  
Because of the world financial crisis and 
economic difficulties of 2008-2009, credit access has 
been increasingly restricted to more financially strong 
firms with low debt to equity ratios (Wu, Guan, and 
Myers, 2014). Sandhu, Hussain, and Matlay (2012) 
argued that Indian farmers encounter barriers in 
accessing agricultural credit. This is because control 
over access to agricultural credit through financial 
institutions (i.e., banks) that behave ethically rests in 
the central bank of India and it has strict requirements 
for agribusiness debt financing. We define the 
agribusiness debt financing provided by financial 
institutions that behave ethically as “ethical source of 
external debt financing”. According to Ghosal and 
Ray (2015), banks offer crop loans at 7% annually, 
while private moneylenders charge 20-30%, if not 
more. Although, private lenders who may not behave 
in an ethical way charge very high interest rates on 
agricultural loans, they have less strict debt financing 
requirements. Because of less strict debt financing 
requirements, farmers become prey to predatory 
lenders from private lending institutions that do not 
fall under the control of the central bank.     
Literature shows that financial institutions use “5 
Cs” of credit -- character of borrower (reputation), 
capital (leverage), capacity (volatility of earnings), 
collateral, and condition (macroeconomic cycle) to 
make credit decisions (see Strischek, 2009; 
Bandyopadhyay, 2007). If a majority of “5 Cs” of 
credit is weak, the lenders decline farm loan 
applications. Thus, “5 Cs” of credit decisions create 
barriers to agribusiness financing, which has a 
negative impact on the growth and survivability of 
agribusiness firms. Therefore, any assistance that can 
help agribusiness firms’ access to debt financing will 
be beneficial to the growth and survivability of 
agribusiness firms. This study concentrates on the 
factors affecting ethical sources of external debt 
financing.   
Different theories in the area of debt financing 
have been developed since the pioneer study of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Although different 
theories have been proposed and developed to explain 
the capital structure of the firm, these theories do not 
provide much information on the factors affecting 
access to ethical sources of agribusiness debt 
financing. For example, the tradeoff theory of Miller 
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(1977), the pecking order theory of Myers (1984), the 
agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), and the 
market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) do 
not provide the factors that minimize barriers to farm 
debt financing. In addition, these theories are not 
directly applicable to the farming industry because the 
nature of this industry differs from other industries 
such as manufacturing and service industries (Guan 
and Oude Lansink, 2006). However, capital structure 
models developed by Collins (1985) and Barry, 
Baker, and Sanint (1981) indicated that debt ratio is a 
decision variable and the optimal debt ratio is found 
when the farmers’ expected utility is maximized (Wu, 
Guan, Myers, 2014, p. 2).  
As with many other firms, the majority of 
agribusiness firms start small where family members 
act as the members of the board of directors to make 
important decisions including debt financing. In most 
cases, the head of the family acts as CEO of the firm. 
Gill, Mand, and Obradovich (2015) found that non-
resident Indian family members (NRIs) of small 
business firms in India play a role by providing 
financial support to their family members in India and 
by serving on the board of directors. Thus, corporate 
control of agribusiness firms resides in the hands of 
family members. 
Literature also shows the impact of access to 
credit on farms’ capital structure decisions. While 
some studies used proxies such as age and credit 
scores (e.g., Bierlen et al., 1998; Barry, Bierlen, and 
Sotomayor, 2000), others such as a study conducted 
by Sandhu, Hussain, and Matlay (2012) used 
collateral, loan guarantees, loan repayment capacity, 
social status, education, solid financial data, default 
risk, administrative costs, and information asymmetry 
to study barriers to farm financing. To remain 
consistent with previous studies, the current study 
used proxies from previous studies to find the factors 
affecting access to ethical sources of external debt 
financing for the agribusiness firms.  
The organization of the remainder of the paper is 
as follows. Section two examines the previous 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section three 
describes the data and methodology used to 
investigate our research questions. Section four 
discusses and analyzes the empirical results. Section 
five concludes and considers the implications of the 
findings. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Because small business firms are financially 
constrained (Joeveer, 2013) and associated with 
higher volatility (Bottazzi, Secchi, and Tamagni, 
2014), these firms have lower access to bank loans 
(Canton et al., 2013) and face tighter pricing terms 
and conditions (Drakos, 2013). The majority of 
agribusiness firms in India are either small or medium 
sized firms. The Indian provision of Micro, Small, and 
Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act of 
2006, classifies Micro, Small, and Medium 
Enterprises (MSMEs) into two categories -- 
manufacturing and services. Agribusiness firms fall 
into the category of production firms since they 
produce agricultural products. Lahiri (2012, p. 4) 
classified MMSEs based on their limits for investment 
in plant, machinery and equipment for manufacturing 
and production enterprises in India as follows: 
 
Enterprise Investment in Plant and Equipment 
Micro 
Enterprises 
 Does not exceed twenty five lakh 
(2.5 million) rupees. 
Small 
Enterprises 
 More than twenty five lakh (2.5 
million) rupees but does not exceed 
five crore rupees. 
Medium 
Enterprises 
 More than five crore (50 million) 
rupees but does not exceed ten crore 
(100 million) rupees. 
  
Agribusiness firms are similar to firms in other 
industries in terms of lenders applying financing terms 
and conditions. Sandhu, Hussain, and Matlay (2012) 
identified factors that represent barriers to credit 
access for agribusinesses such as lack of loan 
collateral, loan guarantees, loan repayment capacity, 
social status of farmers, education of farm owners, 
and lack of solid financial data. In addition, these 
authors identified other barriers such as high default 
risk, higher administrative costs, and information 
asymmetry.  
Because credit risk is the largest risk faced by 
lending institutions such as banks and private lenders 
in agricultural loans, they use the “5 Cs” of credit to 
mitigate lending risk in the farming industry. 
However, private lenders may not be as strict as banks 
(that behave ethically) in applying the “5 Cs” of 
credit, and they charge a very high interest rate. If the 
“5 Cs” of credit are weak, they create barriers to 
access to ethical sources of external debt financing for 
agribusiness firms and, consequently, lenders decline 
the agribusiness loan application. Bandyopadhyay 
(2007) argued that the structure and conduct of 
agricultural lending has been changing rather 
dramatically over the past two decades because of 
contractual and ownership arrangement issues, 
locational issues, management quality, and risk 
management issues; thus, the agricultural lending 
decision-making process is becoming much more 
complex and it creates barriers to agribusiness debt 
financing. The following literature review 
encompasses five sections based on the “5 Cs” of 
credit and provides additional details on factors 
affecting access to ethical sources of external debt 
financing.  
 
2.1 Factors affecting the character 
(reputation) of borrowers and possible 
ways to reduce their impact on ethical 
sources of external agribusiness debt 
financing  
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Credit Bureau records of agribusiness firms and 
their owners demonstrate their history of loan 
payments. Poor credit history and information 
asymmetry issues (i.e., farm owners have better 
information than creditors) reflect unfavorably on the 
character of borrowers. These factors, in turn, affect 
the social status and creditability of borrowers, which 
create barriers to access to ethical sources of 
agribusiness debt financing. Although a bad credit 
record may stem from such things as minor disputes 
between creditors and customers over credit card fees, 
it nevertheless creates barriers to agribusiness debt 
financing because lenders consider it as an important 
determinant of risk management (Gill et al., 2014). 
Lenders perceive poor character as a serious issue 
because it can lead to loan repayment delinquency; 
therefore, lenders tend to decline loan applications for 
those with character issues. Dierkes et al. (2013) 
found that financial institutions highly value business 
credit information to lower their realized default rates.  
To minimize the issue of poor credit bureau 
history (if it exists), agribusiness borrowers should 
aggressively clarify the issue to lenders whether it was 
due to a dispute over, for example, credit card fees. 
Agribusiness borrowers should also build social 
capital (relationships between lenders and clients) 
with bankers to build trust. In addition, poor moral 
values create informational asymmetry issues. Schoar 
(2012) found that the personal interaction between 
borrowers and bankers reduces moral hazard 
problems and the default risk on loans. 
The literature shows that non-resident Indian 
family members (NRIs) provide financial support and 
help their family members in India (Gill, Mand, and 
Obradovich, 2015); therefore, it is strongly 
recommended to use the social capital of NRIs (if one 
has NRIs) to build social status with lenders and to 
reduce information asymmetry, which may reduce 
barriers to agribusiness debt financing. Social capital, 
in the context of this study, is defined as the networks 
of relationships among family members living abroad. 
Financial support from NRIs reduces issues of 
fallback position and lack of liquid assets, which arise 
from the lack of timely cash flows.  
NRIs, in return for supporting their family 
members, expect their families to protect their 
existing assets in India. NRIs also expect their family 
members to build their assets by obtaining higher 
rates of return from agribusiness firms. Thus, both the 
NRIs and their family members can benefit. NRIs 
serve as foreign directors on the board of directors of 
many small business firms (Gill et al., 2015) and visit 
India from time to time due to their strong ties with 
family members living in India. During their visits, 
NRIs meet different bank managers as a part of social 
networking. NRIs also build social capital with Indian 
banks by making deposits and by investing funds in 
the Indian economy (The Press Trust of India, 2011). 
 
2.2 Factors affecting capital (leverage) 
and possible ways to reduce their impact 
on access to ethical sources of external 
agribusiness debt financing  
 
Another barrier to farm financing is a high level of 
debt (leverage) which impacts the loan repayment 
capacity of borrowers as explained by Sandhu, 
Hussain, and Matlay (2012). Du and Dai (2005), using 
data of East Asian firms, found that controlling 
owners prefer a higher level of debt. Vakilifard et al. 
(2011) showed a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and level of debt financing, and a negative 
relationship between board size and leverage in Iran. 
However, these studies used data from publically 
traded firms. Since family members control many of 
the unlisted agribusiness firms, the same situation 
may not prevail. Higher levels of debt in the capital 
structure can be considered another barrier to 
agribusiness debt financing. The board of directors in 
which NRIs serve as foreign directors (Gill, Mand, 
and Obradovich, 2015) make capital structure 
decisions. Poor management of agribusiness firms can 
lead to higher leverage which can create barriers to 
further debt financing. The involvement of NRIs can 
help minimize the barrier to access to debt financing 
due to poor management.  
The majority of unlisted agribusiness firms in 
India does not maintain proper records and does not 
prepare financial statements used by financers; thus, 
lenders do not get all the necessary information they 
need to make lending decisions and tend to reject 
agribusiness loans. Poor agribusiness planning can 
also lead to a higher level of leverage. Agribusiness 
education and training will assist owners of 
agribusiness firms to minimize issues related to their 
lack of business records and financial statements. 
Literature shows that small business firms perform 
better with the involvement of NRIs (Gill, Mand, and 
Obradovich, 2015). Better performance makes 
management appear stronger and minimizes barriers 
to external agribusiness debt financing by improving 
their loan repayment capacity.     
The higher level of debt, however, may not 
actually belong to the farm borrower(s). Agribusiness 
owners, to support the businesses of immediate family 
members and relatives, may have borrowed funds. 
Therefore, family members and relatives, in this 
situation, are responsible for the debt repayment and 
not only the borrowers themselves (Gill et al., 2014). 
However, Schoar (2012) found that personal 
interaction between borrowers and bankers reduces 
default perceptions of lenders.  
  
2.3 Factors affecting loan repayment 
capacity (volatility of earnings) and 
possible ways to reduce their impact on 
access to ethical sources of external 
agribusiness debt financing 
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Because of cyclical performance, seasonal production 
patterns, high capital intensity, leasing of farmland, 
and annual payments of real estate loans, agribusiness 
firms tend to fall into financial difficulties to make 
debt liability payments (Bandyopadhyay, 2007). 
Agribusinesses typically repay loans on an annual 
basis rather than monthly because the cash flow cycle 
is an annual cycle for the farming industry. Volatility 
in agribusiness’ financial performance mainly comes 
from fluctuations in commodity prices and weather 
conditions (Bliss, 2002; Ghosal and Ray, 2015). 
These characteristics may impact agribusiness loan 
repayment capacity. The annual cash flow cycle of 
agribusiness firms, impacts credit risk for agricultural 
loans. For example, poor cash inflow increases default 
risk for creditors and thus, default risk creates barriers 
to ethical sources of external agribusiness debt 
financing.  
To improve the capacity of agribusiness to repay 
loans, agribusiness borrowers should consider 
improving their fallback position by involving other 
parties such as NRIs. The involvement of NRIs can 
improve firm performance (Gill, Mand, and 
Obradovich, 2015). Financial support from NRIs 
builds internal financing sources that reduce issues of 
fallback position and lack of liquid assets, which 
come from the lack of timely cash flows.  
 
2.4 Factors affecting collateral and 
possible ways to reduce their impact on 
ethical sources of external agribusiness 
debt financing 
 
The unavailability of collateral is also a barrier to 
ethical sources of external agribusiness debt 
financing. Collateral, in the context of this study, is 
defined as the availability of tangible and intangible 
assets to be pledged by borrowers. Because farmers 
lease farmland to produce agricultural products, they 
lack the availability of tangible assets used as 
collateral (Bandyopadhyay, 2007). One should not 
ignore the fact that joint family systems are prevalent 
in Asian communities, which are also prevalent in the 
farming industry. In addition, residential and other 
properties are sometimes registered in the names of 
parents out of respect. Therefore, agribusiness 
borrowers should disclose all information and parents 
should be included in the agribusiness loan 
applications where applicable for collateral purposes 
(Gill et al., 2014). The issue of availability of tangible 
collateral arises when agribusiness owners, for 
example, open and operate poultry and/or dairy farms 
because of the nature of live-stocks and intangibility 
of assets such as operating licenses issued by 
franchisors. The co-signing of family members and 
other parties increases the possibility of securing 
agribusiness debt financing.  
 
2.5 Factors affecting market conditions 
(macroeconomic cycle) and possible 
ways to reduce their impact on ethical 
sources of external agribusiness debt 
financing 
 
Characteristics of farm businesses include cyclical 
performance and seasonal production patterns, which 
increase default risk (Bandyopadhyay, 2007). Demand 
for and supply of agricultural products both negatively 
as well as positively affects the farming industry. 
Unfavorable weather conditions causes volatility in 
the market (International Monetary Fund, 2015). 
Market volatility affects character, capital, capacity, 
and collateral of agribusiness borrowers. For example, 
floods may ruin both the land and crops of 
agribusiness firms, which has a negative effect on 
these firms. However, co-signers and retained 
earnings can reduce this barrier to ethical sources of 
external agribusiness debt financing. The appearance 
of NRIs leads to better agribusiness management 
decisions, which can assist in selling agricultural 
products on time at better prices by exploring 
different markets.     
 
2.6 Summary of literature review 
 
In summary, internal financing sources, collateral, 
agribusiness performance, and corporate control with 
the participation of NRIs can improve access to 
ethical sources of external agribusiness debt 
financing.     
A higher level of debt in the capital structure can 
lead to rejection of agribusiness loans. Literature 
shows that NRIs provide financial support to their 
family members in India, which increases internal 
financing sources. Higher internal financing sources 
decrease the level of leverage. The appearance of 
NRIs on the board of directors makes the management 
team appear stronger and leads to better corporate 
decisions, which in turn improves firm performance 
(Gill, Mand, and Obradovich, 2015) and increases the 
chances of maintaining solid financial data and having 
stronger agribusiness planning. Improved financial 
performance and a higher level of internal financing 
sources reduce the level of debt leverage and, 
consequently, the chances of loan default. Thus, there 
are several factors that can assist agribusiness owners’ 
access to ethical sources of external agribusiness debt 
financing. Hence the following hypotheses:   
 
H1: The appearance of NRIs is positively 
associated with access to ethical sources external 
agribusiness debt financing. 
 
H2: Higher levels of internal financing sources 
are positively associated with access to ethical 
sources external agribusiness debt financing. 
 
H3: The availability of collateral is positively 
associated with access to ethical sources external 
agribusiness debt financing. 
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H4: Higher level of agribusiness performance is 
positively associated with access to ethical sources 
external agribusiness debt financing. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
We collected sample data for this study by conducting 
a survey among agribusiness owners in the Punjab 
states of India. First, a large number of residents from 
Punjab have been living abroad for many years 
(Varrel, 2012), and they usually maintain strong home 
ties. Second, many of Punjabi non-residents are 
engaged in self-owned businesses overseas compared 
to other non-resident Indians, and thus are capable 
enough to invest in their home (Varrel, 2012). Finally, 
due to high GDP growth in Punjab, Punjabi non-
resident business owners experience higher growth 
opportunities and better return on investment in 
Punjab than in other parts of India (The Times of 
India, 2014).  
A non-probability (purposive and snowball) 
sample was constructed because the majority of the 
owners of the agribusiness firms were reluctant to 
participate in a research study. To obtain a reasonable 
sample size, an extensive list of agribusiness owners’ 
names and telephone numbers was used to distribute 
surveys and to conduct telephone interviews. We 
collected responses from a total of 122 (34.86%) 
interviewees out of 350 agribusinesses over the 
telephone and through personal visits. We discarded 
two of the survey responses due to inconsistency and 
incomplete answers.  
Common method bias does not appear to be a 
problem because our variables, although self-reported, 
are largely measured objectively. Nevertheless, a 
factor analysis (e.g., Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) 
indicated that common method bias does not seem to 
be a concern for this study. 
 
3.2 Variables and their measurements 
 
We chose several variables used commonly in similar 
studies. Further, we limited the total number of 
variables due to the small sample size and for our 
convenience in conducting surveys over the 
telephone. To collect raw data for constructing the 
variables, we designed the survey questions such that 
respondents felt comfortable disclosing information 
with confidentiality. For instance, rather than asking 
for disclosure of actual sales revenue in the recent 
year, we provided five individual ranges of sales, such 
as, total sales of (i) INR 0 – INR 500,000, (ii) INR 
500,001 – INR 1,000,000, (iii) INR 1,000,001 – INR 
2,000,000, (iv) INR 2,000,001 – INR 3,000,000, (v) 
more than INR 3000,001.     
Ethical sources of external debt financing. 
Ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF) 
for the purposes of this study is defined as the extent 
to which agribusiness owners perceive that they 
borrow funds from financial institutions that i) behave 
in an ethical way, ii) donate funds for the welfare of 
society, and iii) work against money laundering. 
Following the definition, we selected three separate 
components to measure the ESEDF index. We 
categorized their responses on a five-point Likert 
Scale assigning 5 as “Extreme” and 1 as “None”. 
Responses were initially collected for each of the 
above three sources of external debt financing. The 
three measures are highly correlated with correlation 
values ranging from 0.85 to 0.94. Therefore, we 
constructed a new index by using principal component 
analysis (PCA). We constructed the FPSA index using 
the first component, which explains approximately 
93.41% of the variation1.  
Financial performance. The definition of 
financial performance of agribusiness firms (FPAF) 
for the purposes of this study is the agribusiness 
owners’ general perception about the changes in net 
profit margin, return on investment, and cash flow 
from operations of their agribusiness firms. Following 
the definition, we selected three separate components 
to measure the FPSA index. In the survey, we asked 
all participants to rate the extent to which they believe 
there are changes in (i) net profit margin, (ii) return on 
investment, and (iii) cash flow from operations of 
their agribusiness firms. Their responses were 
categorized on a five-point Likert Scale assigning 5 as 
“Gone up a lot” and 1 as “Gone down a lot”. 
Responses were initially collected for each of the 
above three sources of financial performance. The 
three measures are highly correlated with correlation 
values ranging from 0.71 to 0.91. Therefore, we 
constructed a new index by using principal component 
analysis (PCA). We constructed the FPSA index using 
the first component, which explains approximately 
88.59% of the variation2.   
Internal financing sources. Internal financing 
sources (IFS) measures agribusiness owners’ capacity 
to invest his or her personal and family assets in his or 
her own agribusiness firm. IFS is measured as a 
categorical variable where IFS = 1 if an agribusiness 
owner has adequate internal (personal and family) 
financing sources to invest in agribusiness firm. 
Alternatively, IFS = 0 if an agribusiness owner does 
not have adequate internal (personal and family) 
financing sources to invest in an agribusiness firm.   
Collateral. The availability of collateral (COLL) 
is measured as a categorical variable where COLL = 1 
if the agribusiness owner has collateral available for 
the lending institutions. Alternatively, COLL = 0 if no 
collateral is available for the lending institutions.    
                                                          
1
 The eigenvalues of the four principal components are 2.802, 
0.153, and 0.045, respectively. Factors that have eigenvalues 
greater than one are included in the construction of the 
component (Kaiser, 1960) 
2
 The eigenvalues of the four principal components are 2.658, 
0.290, and 0.053, respectively. Factors that have eigenvalues 
greater than one are included in the construction of the 
component (Kaiser, 1960). 
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Non-resident Indians. Non-resident Indians 
(NRI) is measured as a categorical variable where 
NRI = 1 if any family member of agribusiness owner 
lives outside India. Alternatively, NRI = 0 if none of 
their family members reside overseas.    
Board size. Board size (BS) is measured as the 
actual number of members of the board of directors 
(partners). For empirical analyses, we calculated the 
natural logarithm (ln) of average number of board of 
directors.  
CEO duality. CEO duality (CD) is a dummy 
variable with assigned value of 1 if an agribusiness 
owner/operator is both CEO and Chair of the same 
agribusiness firm, or 0 otherwise.  
Firm size. Firm size (FS) is a categorical 
variable. In the survey, we identified five different 
firm sizes as follows: (i) INR 0 – INR 500,000, (ii) 
INR 500,001 – INR 1,000,000, (iii) INR 1,000,001 – 
INR 2,000,000, (iv) INR 2,000,001 – INR 3,000,000, 
(v) more than INR 3000,001. During the survey, 
respondents chose only one category to which the 
average sales of their business belong. For empirical 
analyses, we calculated the natural logarithm (ln) of 
average sales.  
Firm Age. Firm age (FA) is measured as the 
actual age of an agribusiness firm. For empirical 
analyses, we calculated the natural logarithm (ln) of 
actual age of agribusiness firms.  
Interest rate. Interest rate (INT) is measured as 
the actual interest rate that agribusiness firms pay to 
lending institutions. For empirical analyses, we 
calculated the natural logarithm (ln) of actual interest 
rate paid by agribusiness firms on their borrowings.  
Age. Owner age (AGE) is measured as the actual 
age of an agribusiness owner. For empirical analyses, 
we calculated the natural logarithm (ln) of actual age 
of agribusiness owners.  
Education. The education of an agribusiness 
owner (EDU) is a categorical variable with an 
assigned value of 1 = High school or less, 2 = College 
diploma, 3 = Bachelor’s degree, 4 = Master’s degree, 
and 5 = PhD degree or more.  
Agribusiness owner experience. An agribusiness 
owner’s years of experience (EXP), is measured as the 
actual number of years of owner experience. For 
empirical analyses, we calculated the natural 
logarithm (ln) of average number of years’ 
experience.  
Gender. Owner Female Gender (GN) is a 
dummy variable indicating whether agribusiness 
owners report that they are female.  
 
4. Analysis and Discussion of Empirical 
Results 
 
4.1 Empirical Model  
 
Financial performance of agribusiness firms (FPAF), 
internal financing sources (IFS), availability of 
collateral (COLL), and corporate control with the 
participation of NRIs (i.e., BS and NRI) in the board 
of directors minimize barriers to external debt 
financing and thus, improve access to ethical sources 
of external debt financing (ESEDF). Therefore, we 
use five main explanatory variables to estimate the 
following model:     
 
Yi = α0 + α1FPAFi + α2IFSi + α3COLLi + 
α4BSi + α5NRIi +∑Xij + εit  
 
In the model, i refers to an individual 
agribusiness firm, Yi is ESEDF for agribusiness firm 
i, and Xij represents individual control variables (j) 
corresponding to agribusiness firm i. εit is a normally 
distributed disturbance term. In the estimated model, 
α1, α2, α3, α4, and α5 measure the magnitude at 
which FPAF, IFS, COLL, BS, and NRI affect an 
access to ethical sources of external agribusiness debt 
financing for agribusiness firms. We extend this 
model by considering different set of control variables 
once at a time. We estimate the coefficients of 
variables of model by applying ordinary least square 
(OLS) regressions3. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Data Analysis  
  
In the dataset, some of the variables, except ESEDF 
and FPAF indices, are individual dummy variables. 
The data exhibits that the distribution of both ESEDF 
and FPAF is almost symmetrical around their mean 
values and thus there is no outlier present in either of 
these indices. We examined the differences in 
variables among individual firms with and without 
bank financing. Indian banks are considered as 
behaving in an ethical way because they are 
controlled by the central bank.       
We found that agribusiness firms with higher 
financial performance and higher financial resources 
have enhanced ability to access ESEDF (0.76 versus -
0.92) compared to other agribusiness firms with lower 
financial performance and lower financial resources, 
and their differences are significant at the one percent 
level. We observe that agribusiness firms with higher 
financial performance (0.38 versus -0.46) have better 
access to ESEDF compared to other firms with lower 
financial performance, and their differences are 
significant at the one percent level.  
Further, we observe that the mean IFS score 
among agribusiness firms with access to ESEDF is 
0.82 compared to 0.20 in the case of agribusiness 
firms financed by private lending institutions, and 
their differences are significant at the one percent 
level. Likewise, the mean COLL score among 
agribusiness firms with access to ESEDF is 0.90 
compared to 0.22 in the case of firms with lower 
financial resources, and their differences are 
significant at the one percent level. 
                                                          
3
  ESEDF, the first principal component of ESEDF1, ESEDF2 
and ESEDF3, is a continuous variable 
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We also observe that agribusinesses with NRIs, 
large board size, larger firm size, and higher level of 
CEO education have higher access to ESEDF relative 
to the agribusiness firms without NRIs, with smaller 
board size, smaller firm size, and lower level of CEO 
education. Finally, the results exhibited that firms 
with higher financial resources pay a lower interest 
rate on external debt financing compared to firms with 
lower resources that are financed by private lending 
institutions (see Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
ESEDF 0.00 1.00 -1.61 0.46 1.15 
ESEDF1 3.24 1.54 1 4 5 
ESEDF2 3.35 1.45 1 4 5 
ESEDF3 3.40 1.51 1 4 5 
FPAF 0.00 1.00 -2.47 0.33 1.26 
FPAF1 3.59 1.16 1 4 5 
FPAF2 3.65 1.07 1 4 5 
FPAF3 3.71 1.20 1 4 5 
IFS 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 
COLL 0.59 0.49 0 1 1 
NRI 0.39 0.49 0 0 1 
BS 1.13 0.35 0.00 1.10 1.95 
CD 0.53 0.50 0 1 1 
FS 14.20 0.93 12.43 14.73 14.91 
FA 2.95 0.73 1.10 3.22 3.91 
INT 2.61 0.30 1.95 2.48 3.18 
AGE 3.93 0.28 2.89 4.01 4.38 
EDU 1.57 0.96 1 1 4 
EXP 3.15 0.64 1.61 3.40 4.09 
GN 0.73 0.45 0 1 1 
FIN 0.55 0.50 0 1 1 
Notes: Variables include ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF), financial performance of agribusiness firms 
 sources (IFS), collateral (COLL), non-resident Indian family members (NRI), board size (BS), 
CEO duality (CD), firm size (FS), firm age (FA), interest rate (INT), owner age (AGE), owner education (EDU), owner 
experience (EXP), owner female gender (GN), and financing from financial institutions that behave ethical way (FIN). 
 
Table 2. Comparison of agribusiness firm characteristics with and without ethical sources of external 
agribusiness debt financing 
 
Variables 
With ESEDF Without ESEDF Mean Difference 
I II I-II 
ESEDF 0.76 -0.92 1.68*** 
ESEDF1 4.34 1.89 2.45*** 
ESEDF2 4.43 2.04 2.39*** 
ESEDF3 4.51 2.05 2.46*** 
FPAF 0.38 -0.46 0.84*** 
FPAF1 3.99 3.11 0.88*** 
FPAF2 4.06 3.15 0.91*** 
FPAF3 4.13 3.20 0.93*** 
IFS 0.82 0.20 0.62*** 
COLL 0.90 0.22 0.68*** 
NRI 0.49 0.27 0.22** 
BS 1.19 1.04 0.15** 
CD 0.55 0.51 0.04 
FS 14.35 14.01 0.34** 
FA 2.91 2.99 -0.08 
INT 2.40 2.87 -0.47*** 
AGE 3.96 3.89 0.07 
EDU 1.88 1.20 0.68*** 
EXP 3.17 3.13 0.04 
GN 0.79 0.65 0.14* 
Notes: Variables include ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF), financial performance of agribusiness firms 
-resident Indian family members (NRI), board size (BS), 
CEO duality (CD), firm size (FS), firm age (FA), interest rate (INT), owner age (AGE), owner education (EDU), owner 
experience (EXP), and owner female gender (GN). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.   
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The correlation coefficient matrix exhibits that 
FPAF, IFS, COLL, NRI, AGE, and EDU are 
positively and significantly correlated (ρFPAF, 
ESEDF = 0.529; ρIFS, ESEDF = 0.639; ρCOLL, 
ESEDF = 0.687; ρNRI, ESEDF = 0.404; ρAGE, 
ESEDF = 0.269; ρEDU, ESEDF = 0.299, and all 
significant at the one percent level), implying that 
higher financial performance, high internal financing 
sources, higher collateral, appearance of NRIs on the 
board of directors, older CEOs, and higher level  
education of the CEO improve access to ethical 
sources of external agribusiness debt financing in 
India. Further, the results show a negative relationship 
between INT and ESEDF (ρINT, ESEDF = -0.811), 
significant at one percent implying that higher cost of 
capital on agribusiness loans reduces access to ethical 
sources of external agribusiness debt financing (see 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficient 
 
 
ESEDF FPAF IFS COLL NRI CD BS FS FA INT AGE EDU EXP GN 
ESEDF 1              
FPAF 0.529*** 1             
IFS 0.639*** 0.457*** 1            
COLL 0.687*** 0.525*** 0.671*** 1           
NRI 0.404*** 0.353*** 0.270*** 0.296*** 1          
CD -0.013 -0.061 -0.005 0.055 -0.019 1         
BS 0.155 0.217** 0.190** 0.106 0.013 -0.186** 1        
FS 0.147 0.244*** 0.157 0.309*** -0.035 0.009 0.179** 1       
FA 0.025 0.052 0.170 0.119 0.233*** -0.022 0.006 0.269*** 1      
INT -0.811*** -0.442*** -0.572*** -0.632*** -0.294*** 0.034 -0.124 -0.169 -0.039 1     
AGE 0.269*** 0.206** 0.135 0.180** 0.318*** -0.051 0.112 0.038 0.416*** -0.186** 1    
EDU 0.299*** 0.289*** 0.329*** 0.360*** -0.080 -0.159 0.156 0.129 -0.221** -0.274*** 0.006 1   
EXP 0.160 0.171 0.189** 0.199** 0.287*** -0.059 0.125 0.196** 0.719*** -0.143 0.665*** -0.110 1  
GN 0.043 0.003 0.106 0.093 -0.152 0.539*** 0.032 0.166 -0.015 -0.064 -0.070 -0.001 0.026 1 
Notes: Variables include ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF), financial performance of agribusiness firms 
( -resident Indian family members (NRI), CEO duality 
(CD), board size (BS), firm size (FS), firm age (FA), interest rate (INT), owner age (AGE), owner education (EDU), owner 
experience (EXP), and owner female gender (GN). ***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.  
 
4.3  Regression Results and Discussion 
  
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation. 
We find that higher level of FPAF, IFS, COLL, and 
appearance of NRIs on the board of directors improve 
access to ESEDF for agribusiness firms relative to 
agribusiness firms with lower level of FPAF, IFS, 
COLL, and appearance of NRIs on the board of 
directors.  
As shown in model specification I, the 
coefficient of FPAF is 0.140, significant at the ten 
percent level; the coefficient of IFS is 0.537, 
significant at the five percent level; the coefficient of 
COLL is 0.769, significant at the one percent level; 
and the coefficient of NRI is 0.345, significant at the 
one percent level, implying that FPAF, IFS, COLL, 
and NRI improve access to ethical sources of external 
agribusiness debt financing.  
In the following model specifications, we 
include a set of control variables one at a time. For 
instance, in model specification II, we include 
agribusiness firm’s BS and FS, and then we include 
FA, INT, AGE, EDU, EXP, and GN in model 
specification III. Regardless of individual model 
specifications, we find significant and positive 
coefficients of IFS, COLL, and NRI suggesting that a 
higher level of IFS, COLL, and appearance of NRIs 
on the board of directors improve access to ESEDF 
for agribusiness firms relative to agribusiness firms 
with a lower level of IFS, COLL, and participation of 
NRIs in the board of directors. These findings remain 
robust when we consider all control variables together 
(refer to model specification III). The results exhibit 
that higher cost of debt capital reduces access to 
ethical sources of external agribusiness debt financing 
(refer to model specification III).  
 Appendix A reports the expectations of NRIs. 
The majority of the NRIs expect their family members 
protect their existing assets, achieve higher rate of 
return, build their assets, and maintain their properties 
in return for supporting their family members. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 13, Issue 1, Autumn 2015, Continued – 4 
 
443 
Table 4. Ordinary least square regression analysis 
 
Variables I II III 
FPAF 0.140* 0.147* 0.073 
 (1.87) (1.93) (1.22) 
IFS 0.537** 0.522** 0.328** 
 (3.23) (3.11) (2.36) 
COLL 0.769*** 0.812*** 0.328** 
 (4.39) (4.44) (2.13) 
NRI 0.345** 0.327** 0.251** 
 (2.59) (2.41) (2.19) 
BS 0.091 0.105 0.052 
 (0.50) (0.57) (0.36) 
CD - -0.028 0.021 
 - (-0.22) (0.18) 
FS - -0.59 -0.007 
 - (-0.83) (-0.11) 
FA - - -0.127 
 - - (-1.27) 
INT - - -1.779*** 
 - - (-8.25) 
AGE - - 0.481** 
 - - (2.07) 
EDU - - 0.003 
 - - (0.06) 
EXP - - -0.079 
 - - (-0.60) 
GN - - -0.001 
 - - (-0.01) 
Constant -0.982*** -0.159 2.930** 
 (-4.22) (-0.16) (2.25) 
N 181 181 181 
F-test statistic 31.99*** 22.71*** 26.84*** 
R2 0.580 0.582 0.764 
Notes: In the regression models, the dependent variable is ethical sources of external debt financing (ESEDF). Independent 
(COLL), non-resident Indian family members (NRI), board size (BS), CEO duality (CD), firm size (FS), firm age (FA), 
interest rate (INT), owner age (AGE), owner education (EDU), owner experience (EXP), and owner female gender (GN). 
***, ** and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
5. Conclusion 
  
By taking a sample of agribusiness firms, this study 
concentrated on factors affecting access to ethical 
sources of external agribusiness debt financing in 
India. This study provides a mechanism through 
which agribusiness owners may improve access to 
ethical sources of external debt financing which in 
turn lowers the cost of debt capital. The paper shows 
that internal financing sources, collateral, and the 
appearance of NRIs on the board of directors improve 
access to ethical sources of external agribusiness debt 
financing. Since NRIs help improve access to ethical 
sources of agribusiness debt financing, agribusiness 
owners should consider NRIs serving on the board of 
directors. There is, however, no free lunch; that is, the 
majority of the NRIs expect their family members to 
protect their existing assets, achieve a higher rate of 
return, build their assets, and maintain their properties 
in return for supporting their family members in India.  
 
6. Limitations  
 
This study relies on the perceptions and judgments of 
research participants because we collected data using 
surveys and interviews. Not all family involvements 
(or NRI associations) are the same; some NRI 
families are more involved than others, and some NRI 
families, by virtue of their wealth or status can 
facilitate access to agribusiness financing by 
providing financial support and by participating in the 
board of directors as foreign members.  
This is a co-relational study that investigates the 
association between the perceived access to ethical 
sources of external agribusiness debt financing and 
the factors affecting perceived access to ethical 
sources of external agribusiness debt financing. There 
is not necessarily a causal relationship between the 
two. The findings of this study may only be 
generalized to firms similar to those that were 
included in this research.  
 
7. Future Research 
 
Although we have bridged some gaps in the literature, 
many questions still remain unanswered. One such 
question is to understand how agribusinesses that have 
NRIs improve access to ethical sources of external 
debt financing. Since NRI families, by virtue of their 
wealth or status, can facilitate access to ethical 
sources of external debt financing by providing 
financial support and by participating in the board of 
directors as foreign members, we call for a direct and 
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objective measure of the strength of this involvement 
in future research.     
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Appendix A 
 
Expectations of non-resident family members in return to supporting their family members 
1 Protect their existing assets. Yes = 27  No = 21 
2 Higher rate of return from their investment(s) for serving on the board of directors. Yes = 25  No = 23 
3 Build their assets to reward for their investment(s). Yes = 25  No = 23 
4 Maintain their properties. Yes = 28  No = 20 
N = 48. 
 
 
